0. Introduction. It is well known that for much of the mathematics of topos theory, it is in fact sufficient to use a category C whose slice categories C/A are cartesian closed. In such a category, the notion of a 'generalized set', for example an 'Aindexed set', is represented by a morphism B^-A of C, i.e. by an object of C/A. The point about such a category C is that C is a C-indexed category, and more, is a hyperdoctrine, so that it has a full first order logic associated with it. This logic has some peculiar aspects. For instance, the types are the objects of C and the terms are the morphisms of C. For a given type A, the predicates with a free variable of type A are morphisms into A, and 'proofs' are morphisms over A. We see here a certain 'ambiguity' between the notions of type, predicate, and term, of object and proof: a term of type A is a morphism into A, which is a predicate over A; a morphism 1 -> A can be viewed either as an object of type A or as a proof of the proposition A.
that paper. In particular, a fuller discussion of the ' condition on variables' is given there ( §2-2).
An ML system permits the construction of 'terms', 'types', and of expressions of the form teT ('t is a term of type T'), s = t, when seT, teT have been derived, and S = T. We identify expressions differing only by a change of bound variables. If we write e\x\, then x denotes all free occurrences of a; in the expression e, and e [a] is then the result of replacing these occurrences with a, under the assumption that a is substitutable in e. If x lt ..., x n is a sequence of variables, we say x lt ...,x n ,e satisfy the condition on variables (c.o.v.) if for each i < n, x i does not occur in the type of any free variable of e other than x k , for k > i.Ifx lt ...,x n contains all free variables occurring It should be noted that 'occur' is used in the following sense: if xeX occurs in e, then any variables occurring in X also occur in e. We may write if the variables are properly listed in e[x v ..., x n ].
1-1.
Definition. An ML theory is given by a language which includes a set of typed type-valued function constants, a set of typed term-valued function constants, and variables and constants as indicated in the following rules. (By 'typed function constants' we mean that the arguments have types specified, and in the case of termvalued constants, the value has its type specified as well. We assume the arguments are properly listed.) l-l-l. Type formation rules. The following are to be types: (i) If F is a type-valued function constant, and a v ...,a n are terms of the appropriate types, then F(a v ...,a n ) is a type.
(ii) 1 is a type. (fen) If / is a term-valued function constant, and a 1) ...,a n are terms of the appropriate types, then f(a v ..., a n ) is a term of the appropriate type.
(II) * e l . 
Furthermore, an ML theory may have axioms of the form S = T for types S, T. (We suppose similar axioms for terms are given by function constants of the appropriate I-type.)
Finally, we have the usual rules for = : for types or terms o, b, c (as appropriate):
If a = b and b = c, then a = c. a = a.
If cea and a = b, then ce6. If aec and a = b, then 6ec.
1-2.
Remarks. There are obvious similarities between ML and first order logic -the types of ML correspond to predicates, and the terms of ML to derivations of the predicates, so that' t e T' can be interpreted as ' t proves T'. Under this interpretation,
, and 1 is T. Furthermore, the term formation rules are then the introduction and elimination rules in a natural deduction system for first order (intuitionistic) logic, as in Prawitz [7] or [8] (also Seely [10] , where equality is included in the system).
There is a slight problem with (SE): although it specializes properly to (AE), it does not seem quite like (3E), which is usually denoted 3xeABjx] C C where {} denote a discharged assumption, and where x must not occur freely in 3xeAB [x] ,C, or any assumption other than B on which C depends. This is more closely given by Martin-Lof 's version of (SE) in [5] [9] or [10] .)
It is easy to see that the (£E), (2 red), (S exp) of ML are special cases of (2 elim), (2 red n), (2 exp n), but it is also true that they imply the more general forms. For example, the I in (2 elim) may be given by l(z) = t[n(z), n'(z)]; the other equations follow immediately.
The equality rules for ML, under the interpretation of ML as first order logic, correspond to the operations on derivations given in Seely [10] . (The (Irule) corresponds to Corollary 1 of §2 of [10] , and is a consequence of the rule (RCoh) expressing that 'z = x' is isomorphic to T x , the terminal 'truth' predicate. It expresses that equality is given by an equalizer; it does not occur in Martin-Lof [5] .) So, in effect, terms correspond rather to equivalence classes of derivations ('proofs') in first order logic, than to derivations themselves. There is one major difference between ML and first order logic: in regarding types as predicates, we then use both notions at the same time in forming U xeA B [x] , ~L xeA B[x\. Equivalently, we are quantifying in some sense over proofs of predicates. It is precisely this ambiguity between types (as 'sets') and predicates that we need to characterize locally cartesian closed categories.
In addition to the analogy with first order logic, the notation suggests the terms and types have a naive interpretation in Sets: II and 2 are the cartesian product and disjoint union of indexed families respectively. 1 is the singleton family. / is the identity: if a, b are indexed families of objects then I (a, b) is the family made up of singletons where a and b are equal and of null sets where they are not. This is the basis for what follows, as will be seen in §4.
1-3. As in Seely [10] , from the substitution rule for equality (i.e. (= E)) we can derive symmetry and transitivity of equality: 
2. Categorical preliminaries. For basics, refer to Mac Lane [4] . 2-1. Definition. A locally cartesian closed category (LCC) C is a category C with finite limits, such that for any object A of C, the slice category C/A is cartesian closed.
2-1-1. Remark. C/A has as its objects all morphisms B->A of C (for all possible B).
Morphisms in C/A are commutative triangles over A:
If C has finite limits, then each category C/A also has. However, even if C has exponents, the categories C/A need not have them: that they do is the essential property of an LCC category.
2-2.
Definition. For C a category with finite limits, a C-indexed category P consists of:
(i) for each object A of C, a category P(A), (ii) for each morphism/: A^-B of C, afunctor/*: 
I 1
is a pullback in C, then for any object <f> of P(C), ~L k h*<l> ->/*E ff <f> is an isomorphism in P(J4). (A similar condition for FI follows from this.) 2-4. Any category C with finite limits induces a C-indexed category (which we shall denote C also) given by C(^4) = C/A;f* is then defined by pullback. One of the basic results of topos theory is the following.
THEOREM. / / C has finite limits, then C is LCC iff as a C-indexed category C is a hyperdoctrine.
A proof may be found in Freyd [3] , § 1-3. The point is that for all A, C/A is cartesian closed iff for all/,/* has a right adjoint H f . For any C with finite limits, each/* of C has a left adjoint 2y (defined by composition), and the Beck condition for C is satisfied (it says the composite of two pullback diagrams is a pullback diagram, which is always true).
2-5. In Seely [10] it is shown that the category of hyperdoctrines is equivalent to the category of first order theories (with equality). With the interpretation of ML theories as special first order theories, and of LCC categories as special hyperdoctrines, the connection between ML theories and LCC categories seems natural.
2-6. Definition. Two C-indexed categories P x and P 2 are equivalent, P x ~ P 2 , if for each A, there is an equivalence Pi(A) ~ P 2 (^l), and furthermore, these equivalences commute with the/*'s.
2-6-1. Remark. If P x ~ P 2 as C-indexed categories, and if P x is a hyperdoctrine, 
Similarly idjjof = /, ho (gof) = (hog) of.
3-1-2. Products. 1 is the terminal object of C(M).
Given any object A, there is a morphism A -> 1, namely A xeA *.
LEMMA. For any closed type A, if t is a closed term of type
(Ired).
For objects A,B, AxB is given by AxB; pah-ing <,), and projections n, n' are likewise given by' themselves', and that the requisite equations are satisfied is obvious from (S red) and (S exp).
3-1-3. LEMMA (PTJLLBACKS). Givent: A->B, s: C-+B, thepullback Pof s along t p C -» B is given by H xeA 'E yeC I(t(x),s(y)), with the evident projections to A and C: p is n and q is nn'.
Proof. Given/: X->A, g: X->C such that tf = sq, note that there is a term
viz. r(t(f(x))
). Define h: X^P by A a€:c </(*),<£(*),^)». Clearly ph = / a n d qh = g, and (using the (I rule) to see p(x) is the only possible term in I(t(f(x)), s(q(x)))) his unique with this property. 
It is a routine exercise to see these operations are inverse. (ii) for a term feB^A Proof. The proof of this fact is exactly like the proof that C(M) was cartesian closed. (We never really needed to know that the objects were closed types, so repeat the arguments with a parameter xeA.)
3-2-3. LEMMA. For any closed type A, C(M)/A ~ P(M) (A).

Proof. We define functors C(M)/A ^^> P(M) (^4):
A so that f = goh, h is the term A 2e/ -i( a . ) <A(77 1 (z)),p)e/-1 (a;) ^g'Hx), where pel(x, g(h{n(z)))) is defined by 'transitivity' from n'{z) el(x,f{n(z))) and r(j(n{z)))el(f(n(z)), g(h(n(z)))), using Lemma 1-3.
(ii) For B [x] in P(M)(-4), B is the morphism in C(M) given by the projection n: I, X€A 
We must now show these are functors, and the two composites are isomorphic to the identity functors. We shall not give all the details -the highlights are the following. 
) Clearly j(i{y)) = y. For the inverse, i(j((x, (y, z») = <J{y),{y, r(f(y)))) and thus we are done if we show x =f{y), z = r{f(y)). But since zel{x,f(y)), this is a consequence of the (I rule).
3-2-3-2. SUBLEMMA. For B[x] a type, xeA, the objects B[x] and are isomorphic in P(M)(A).
Proof. Morphisms B[x]^IZ!>'L yel^AB[x] I(x,n(y)) are given by m i(z) = «x,z),r(x)} ior x, x' e A, z e B[x], z' e B[x'], v e I(x, x'), (with the familiar abuse of language.) Clearly j(i(z)) = z. Inversely, i(j(((x',z'y,v))) = ({x,z'),r(x))
, and we are done if x = x', z' eB [x] , and v = r(x). These follow from the (I rule) as before.
3-2-3-3. SUBLEMMA. / / A is a closed type, B[x A ] a type in P(M) (A), then there is a bijection between the set of terms t[x] e B[x] and the set of (closed) terms seA => T, xeA B[x satisfying n(s(x)) = x.
Remark. To see the significance of this, recall that P(M) (^4) is cartesian closed and that A =; J: xeA 1 in C(M).
Proof. The functors of 3-2-3 in this case specialize to t[x]^t = \ x€A (x,t[x]),
The composites are (i)
and (ii) n'((\ xeA (x,t[x]y) (x)) = n'{(x,t[x])) = t[x]. (These proofs also work if A, B, B[x] have other parameters, and a similar result holds for B[x]
with more than one (extra) variable.)
3-2-4. PEOPOSITION. AS C(M)-indexed categories, C(M) ~ P(M).
Proof. The only other point to verify is that the equivalences of Lemma 3-2-3 commute with the/*'s: given/: B-+A in C(M), it suffices to show that (ii) for a term-valued function constant, /, with arguments of type X lt ...,X n , and value of type A, a morphism/: X n^-A of C/X, X the codomain of X n and A. X n , A must be defined consistently with 4-4. We shall generally write F = <fi: F-+X n (abusing the notation horribly!).
C(M)/A S * » C(M)/JJ commutes. Let t: C^A be in C{M)/A; t = t~\x A ) in P(M)(A), f*(t) = t~l(f(y B )), and (/•(?))» is X veB t-Hf(y))^B, i.e. Zy 6S Z. eO Hf(y),t(z)) + B. But this is just the definition of the pullback of t along/, as in
4-2.
Given an interpretation ~: M -> C, we shall extend it to all types and terms of M: a type depending on a free variable xeA will be interpreted as an object in C/A (for suitable A), and terms will be interpreted as morphisms in the appropriate slice categories. In particular, a closed type A (with no free variables) will correspond to an object A of C, and if t [v] e A depends only o n e e l , t will correspond to a morphism t: X ->A. The main intuitive idea is that we think of the type B[x A ] as the morphism
•n: I, xeA B[x] -> A, (this will be B-> A), and so B -+ A is the type / -
1 (x A ), as in Lemma 3-2-3; note that via this interpretation, / is the projection n. 
4-3. Remark (concerning the condition on variables
4-4.
We now extend the notion of interpretation to all terms and types of M. Since M is (like) a first order theory, and C is a hyperdoctrine, this follows the ideas of Seely [10] closely; we give fairly complete details to allow the reader to verify 4-5.
Definition (continued).
Given an interpretation ~: M->C (as in 4-1), the extension of ~ to all types and terms of M is defined as follows (i.e. the following equalities must be true of ~): The morphism between these pullbacks is induced by the commutative square
(Substitution). The substitution of a term t in a type
by the pullback's universal property. The proof of the soundness theorem is a straightforward matter of checking definitions. Since a similar sort of result is discussed in Seely [10] , I omit most of the details here.
4-5. PROPOSITION (SOUNDNESS
(1 red) is valid since 1 is a terminal object. 
n\ns)(x).
It is easy to check these are inverse.
4-6-1. Given an ML theory M and an LCC C, an interpretation ~: M -»• C induces a functor F: C(M)-»-C preserving all LCC structure. Under ~, closed types of M are interpreted as objects of C, and closed terms as morphisms; it can then be checked that this is in fact functorial. That LCC structure is preserved follows from soundness (4) (5) . Hence: 5. From LCC to ML. Given an LCC category C, we define an ML theory M(C), basically by mimicking the definition (4-1, 4-4) of an interpretation. The objects of C are to be the type constants of M(C) (i.e. type-valued function symbols with no argument), and the morphisms of C are to be term-valued function symbols, with argument and value of types given by the domain and codomain respectively. Following the steps of 4-4, the other types and terms are defined as objects and
